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“ARBITRATION SCHMARBITRATION”:  
EXAMINING THE BENEFITS AND 
FRUSTRATIONS OF DEFINING THE 
PROCESS 
Jean R. Sternlight* 
 As Deborah Hensler and Damira Khatam observe in their lead essay in this 
symposium, “Re-Inventing Arbitration,” “arbitration” looks very different, de-
pending where and how it is used.1 They aptly explain that commentators on 
arbitration tend to view the process from their various “silos,” and do not typi-
cally try to come up with a unified field theory of arbitration, nor examine 
where this might lead in terms of policy implications.2 In an effort to remedy 
this disunity, Hensler and Khatam focus on three disparate types of arbitration: 
domestic, investor-state, and international commercial.3 Drawing on their anal-
ysis they try to mold an appropriate definition of arbitration and then use that 
definition to help us better design both arbitral and litigation processes.4 They 
urge that arbitration has been “re-invented” to handle more public disputes, 
making the arbitration process more formal and litigation-like, and that this re-
invention of arbitration “risks undermining its value for private actors with pri-
vate disputes, while at the same time undermining courts as institutions for 
public contest over public policy issues.”5 
 Professor Deborah Hensler initially presented these ideas in a talk, the in-
augural Chris Beecroft Jr. Lecture on Conflict Resolution, given at UNLV in 
the spring of 2017.6 Chris Beecroft Jr. was the ADR Commissioner for Clark 
County, Nevada from 2001 to 2016, and he contributed immeasurably to the 
                                                        
*  Michael and Sonja Saltman Professor of Law, & Director Saltman Center for Conflict 
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1  Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the 
Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and 
Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 381 (2018). 
2  See id. at 421–25. 
3  Id. at 382–83. 
4  Id. 
5  Id. at 381. 
6  CLE: Re-Inventing Arbitration: Drawing Lessons from International Trade Treaty Con-
troversies, UNLV WILLIAM S. BOYD SCH. L., https://www.law.unlv.edu/event/cle-re-
inventing-arbitration-drawing-lessons-international-trade-treaty-controversies [https://perma. 
cc/LN6Y-LW3C] (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). 
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conflict resolution community in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the nation. For ex-
ample, he created an extremely innovative “short trial” program designed to 
provide disputants with a trial experience that could be quicker and cheaper 
than a traditional trial.7 Commissioner Beecroft was constantly thinking about 
how to provide disputants with a better and more just experience. Thus, it is 
most appropriate that Professor Hensler should use the inaugural lecture to urge 
us to better devise our arbitral and litigation systems of justice. After Professor 
Hensler gave her lecture, the Nevada Law Journal circulated a preliminary ver-
sion of her article (co-authored with Damira Khatam) to the excellent commen-
tators whose remarks are also contained in this symposium. I am delighted that 
so many accomplished arbitration scholars were willing and able to provide 
their own thoughts on related matters, thus turning the lecture into a rich issue 
of this law journal. I note, however, that constraints of timeliness precluded us 
from ensuring that all the authors had the chance to comment on the most re-
cent versions of each other’s work.  
 Hensler and Khatam are certainly correct in their assessment that arbitra-
tion lacks a unifying theory. Indeed, if anything they have understated the vari-
ety of processes that are sometimes called “arbitration.” If they were to have 
also examined labor arbitration,8 lemon law arbitration, baseball arbitration, 
non-binding court connected arbitration, on-line arbitration of consumer dis-
putes, uses of arbitration to resolve Olympics or other athletic drug-use contro-
versies, state-to-state arbitration, and so on, it would be even more obvious that 
arbitration in one setting looks nothing like arbitration in another.9 As commen-
tator David Noll observes, “the term [arbitration] actually refers to several dis-
tinct systems, each with its own basis of authority, procedures, and external 
constraints.”10 
 Indeed, in teaching arbitration, I have sometimes challenged my students to 
come up with a good definition of arbitration, or at least a good description of 
arbitration. They think this will be simple, and easily throw out words like 
“private,” “speedy,” “informal,” and “inexpensive.” I then typically respond 
with that ever-present law school mantra, “it depends.” As Hensler and Khatam 
have shown, processes called arbitration are not always private, speedy, infor-
mal, or inexpensive. And, perhaps more frustratingly from a definitional stand-
point, it is not that arbitration is trying and failing to meet these goals, but often 
that in certain contexts it does not even aspire to these attributes. Along similar 
                                                        
7   Obituary: Chris Beecroft Jr., LEGACY.COM, http://obits.reviewjournal.com/obituaries/lvrj/ 
obituary.aspx?pid=183490847 [https://perma.cc/YE87-JDD8] (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). 
8  See CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL 
MODEL 397–401 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing both grievance and interest arbitrations in the la-
bor law setting). 
9  See id. at 383–84 (observing that “there are immense variations among arbitration process-
es,” and going on to discuss uses of arbitration in a variety of disparate settings). Of course, I 
am not suggesting that the authors should have taken on such a gargantuan endeavor! 
10  David L. Noll, Response: Public Litigation, Private Arbitration?, 18 NEV. L.J. 477, 478 
(2018). 
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lines, one cannot accurately say whether arbitrators write reasoned decisions, 
whether arbitral decisions are published, whether arbitrators apply evidentiary 
rules, or whether arbitration decisions are final. Thus, when commentators 
(such as myself!) try to come up with a definition of “arbitration,” they typical-
ly provide a very impoverished definition, such as “a process in which a third 
party who is not acting as a judge renders a decision in a dispute,”11 or “a bind-
ing adjudication of a dispute by private decision-makers outside a public court 
system.”12 
 Hensler and Khatam are to be lavishly commended for bravely entering 
this fray. Their effort at unifying the field of arbitration is very helpful to those 
of us who have pondered whether, why, and when arbitration is a valuable dis-
pute resolution technique. As the many responses to their lead essay demon-
strate, their article truly has inspired good thought on the questions of how arbi-
tration should be defined and when it should be used. For example, Benjamin 
Edwards points out that by allowing domestic securities brokers to require in-
vestors to resolve claims against their brokers in arbitration, rather than litiga-
tion, we have permitted these disputes to be buried in a lawless shadow.13 
Along related lines, Teresa Verges urges that securities arbitration, while fairer 
than some other forms of forced arbitration, still is not fair enough and ought to 
be fixed through legislation, if possible.14 Looking more generally at all of do-
mestic arbitration, Imre Szalai urges courts to view arbitration through a “lens 
of procedure,” and therefore treat arbitration as procedural and reduce the 
preemptive scope of the Federal Arbitration Act.15 This approach would give 
states more authority to regulate arbitration as they see fit. In his article, 
Guillermo Garcia Sanchez points out that investor-state arbitration is an odd 
amalgam of public and private, noting that while the process is open and public 
in some ways, arbitrators generally issue purely monetary awards, rather than 
                                                        
11  MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 383. 
12  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at (387) (citing Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitra-
tion a Form of ADR?: An Argument That the Term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive Its Useful-
ness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97, 97–98 (2000)); see also Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance 
of Arbitration—A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 699 (1952) (“The 
four essential aspects of arbitration are (1) it is resorted to only by agreement of the parties; 
(2) it is a method not of compromising disputes but of deciding them; (3) the person making 
the decision has no formal connection with our system of courts; but (4) before the award is 
known it is agreed to be ‘final and binding.’ ”). Yet, some “arbitration” is mandated by court 
rules, state or small print contract; some arbitrators do make compromise determinations; 
some arbitrators could be persons who also serve as judges; and some arbitral awards are 
non-binding. 
13  Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 NEV. L.J. 427, 430 (2018). 
14  Teresa J. Verges, Evolution of the Arbitration Forum as a Response to Mandatory Arbi-
tration, 18 NEV. L.J. 437, 438–39 (2018). 
15  Imre S. Szalai, Reconciling Fault Lines in Arbitration and Redefining Arbitration 
Through the Broader Lens of Procedure, 18 NEV. L.J. 511, 512 (2018). 
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injunctions or orders for specific performance.16 This practice, according to 
Garcia Sanchez, allows both the state and investors to benefit. “Even if both 
sides complain in public about the existence of unaccountable arbitrators, the 
investors get paid, and the governments keep their policies intact.”17 
My own take can be boiled down to “arbitration schmarbitration,” reflect-
ing my uncertainty as to whether it is possible, or even desirable, to come up 
with a single useful definition of what are truly a series of disparate processes. 
As Professor Michael Moffitt deftly discusses in his related article, “Schmedia-
tion and the Dimensions of Definition,”18 definition is in the end often an odd 
endeavor, in that one wonders whether the enterprise is descriptive, prescrip-
tive, or something else.19 Are we defining to try to describe existing reality or 
to change it to conform with an aspirational definition? 
Hensler and Khatam are undoubtedly correct that some arbitration—
commercial arbitration—was traditionally private, informal, speedy, cheap, and 
equitable. Calling this the “folkloric” version of arbitration, Professor Ed 
Brunet recognizes that “folklore arbitration is both a mythical perception and a 
reality.”20 He explains that “[t]he historical roots of folklore arbitration lie in 
the use of arbitration to resolve intraindustry disputes in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.”21 Like Hensler and Khatam, Brunet points out that 
arbitration today “can often be a very different process than folklore arbitra-
tion”22—far more formal and judicialized, in part because commercial arbitra-
tion is now used to resolve a far broader range of disputes.23 
It is also unquestionably true that both international commercial arbitra-
tion24 and investor-state arbitration25 do not and indeed have never shared the 
                                                        
16  Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez, The Blurring of the Public/Private Distinction or the Col-
lapse of a Category? The Story of Investment Arbitration, 18 NEV. L.J. 489, 491–93 (2018). 
17  Id. at 508. 
18  Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 69 (2005). In Section I of his article, Moffitt describes what he calls “the ‘schmediation 
phenomenon,’ calling particular attention to ways in which scholars and practitioners have 
addressed the enormous variety of practices currently labeled ‘mediation.’ ” Id. at 72. His use 
of the pseudo-Yiddish term draws in turn on the work of Robert Nozick who, in a footnote, 
used the term “schmoctoring” to describe “an activity just like doctoring except that its goal 
is to earn money for the practitioner.” Id. at 73 (quoting ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, 
AND UTOPIA 235 (1974)). 
19  Moffitt was commenting on what one might call “ye olde” debate about the appropriate 
nature of mediation, and whether “evaluative mediation” deserves to be called “mediation,” 
or instead is truly an oxymoron. Id. at 82–85 (discussing Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. 
Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 
(1996)). 
20  Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 39, 42 (1999). 
21  Id. at 43. 
22  Id. at 45. 
23  Id. at 45–46; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010). 
24  See generally 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2009). 
18 NEV. L.J. 371, STERNLIGHT- FINAL 3/27/18 12:15 PM 
Winter 2018] ARBITRATION SCHMARBITRATION 375 
folkloric ethos. Disputants adopt arbitration in those contexts for different rea-
sons altogether—not to obtain a speedy, inexpensive determination from an ex-
pert in the field, but rather to create a dispute resolution process that will give 
businesses reasonable confidence that future disputes can be resolved in a neu-
tral forum, and yield an enforceable determination.26 Hensler and Khatam are 
also correct that both international commercial arbitration and investor-state 
arbitration look a lot like litigation in the United States.27 
But what are we to make of these empirical observations? It is true that it is 
confusing to use a single term—“arbitration”—to describe such disparate pro-
cesses. A person who is highly familiar with one form of arbitration would be 
shocked and confused to learn that the process they know and understand so 
well in one setting plays out completely differently in another context. Whereas 
some forms of arbitration are cheap, speedy, and informal,28 others are expen-
sive, slow, and quite formal.29 Sometimes arbitrators write long decisions that 
are published,30 and some arbitral proceedings are open to the public.31 Howev-
er, lots of things in life are confusing, and we certainly cannot expect to allevi-
ate all such issues. 
Hensler and Khatam do express a far more serious concern that goes way 
beyond mere confusion. They assert that by losing track of the appropriate es-
sence of both arbitration and litigation, we have lost the best features of both 
processes.32 Arbitration, they suggest, is most appropriately used to resolve pri-
vate disputes quickly, cheaply, and efficiently.33 By contrast, litigation, they 
urge, is meant for public disputes and justifiably can be more formal, as well as 
slower and more expensive.34 In focusing on process integrity—using each 
process to best fulfill its essence—Hensler and Khatam follow a distinguished 
path. Most notably, jurisprude Lon Fuller endeavored to set out the essential 
                                                                                                                                 
25  See generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 
(2007). 
26  For a short discussion of the goals of international commercial arbitration, see MENKEL-
MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 391–92. Regarding the goals of investor-state arbitration, 
see Hiro N. Aragaki, The Metaphysics of Arbitration: A Reply to Hensler and Khatam, 18 
NEV. L.J. 541, 548–50 (2018) and Garcia Sanchez, supra note 16, at 497–501). 
27  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 408; see also Aragaki, supra note 26, at 445–48, 566, 
572) (discussing broad disparities in categories of arbitration, and questioning whether a 
clear line can or should be drawn between arbitration and litigation). 
28  Brunet, supra note 20 at 42. 
29  See, e.g., James Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, AM. LAW., 
Jan.–Feb. 1985, at 107. 
30  MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 385. 
31  See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Doping Control, Mandatory Arbitration, and Process 
Dangers for Accused Athletes in International Sports, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 5, 5 n.* 
(2009) (thanking arbitral panel and disputants for public access to arbitration of cyclist Floyd 
Landis doping issues). 
32  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 381. 
33  Id. at 402. 
34  Id. at 422. 
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moralities of certain processes including not only litigation, arbitration, and 
mediation, but also legislation, contract, and managerial discretion.35 
While I share most of Hensler and Khatam’s empirical observations, I am 
quite unsure about some of their normative recommendations. Like them, I 
want to ensure that all our dispute resolution processes support justice for pri-
vate disputants and for the public. Indeed, I believe this so strongly that I have 
made a conscious effort to end most of my articles with the word “justice.”36 I 
also agree with many and perhaps most of their policy positions with respect to 
particular types of arbitration. Most notably, I have long been a critic of the 
forced or mandatory form of domestic commercial arbitration, in part because I 
believe we should not permit private companies to take important issues of 
public policy out of the public eye.37 However, I am less confident than they 
are that we can easily distinguish between public and private implications. As 
commentators Hiro Aragaki, Guillermo Garcia Sanchez, and David Noll all ob-
serve, the line between public and private has been confounding us for many 
years.38 Investment arbitration is a great exemplar of this confusion, because 
                                                        
35  See, e.g., THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L FULLER (Ken-
neth I. Winston ed., Hart Publ’g, rev. ed. 2001) (1981); Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining 
and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 3, 23–24 (1963); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits 
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 370–71, 394–95, 398 (1978) (arguing that adjudica-
tion is well suited to claims of right and accusations of guilt, but not to resolve “polycentric” 
disputes in which the disposition of one item has implications for the disposition of others); 
see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Found-
ers of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 14–22 (2000) (discussing expositions of the 
essentials of various dispute resolution processes); Mentschikoff, supra note 12, at 710 (as-
serting that “[t]here appears to be much more of good than of evil in the arbitration process,” 
in that arbitrators often have flexibility and expertise that may be missing in litigation, but 
recognizing too that arbitration may sometimes disserve the public interest, particularly in 
the creation of precedent). 
36  See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1631, 1675 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration]; Jean R. 
Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment Discrimination Laws: 
A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1499 (2004) [hereinafter Sternlight, Enforc-
ing Employment Discrimination Laws]; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: 
Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 
712 (1996). 
37  See, e.g., Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 36, at 1671–75 (urging 
that the problem with forced consumer and employment arbitration is not simply that the ar-
bitrations are private, but also that this form of dispute resolution is imposed by private par-
ties, rather than legislatively). 
38  Aragaki, supra note 26, at 544–46 (questioning whether or why it is problematic to use 
private forums to adjudicate public claims); Garcia Sanchez, supra note 16, at 507 (arguing 
that the public/private distinction has reached a point of “hopeless contradiction,” and urging 
that in the investment arbitration context, states are permitted to violate the rights of investor 
companies with significant impunity, in that arbitrators typically impose, at most, monetary 
penalties which may in the end not even be enforceable); Noll, supra note 10, at 479 (sug-
gesting that the identification of particular disputes as either “public” or “private” reflects 
“political judgments about where the public interest lies, and costs and benefits of channel-
ing disputes to competing dispute-resolution systems”). 
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state interests and state laws are always in play in this process that some might 
say is private in nature. 
I am also less confident than Hensler and Khatam that a labeling or defini-
tional enterprise is the best way to ensure that arbitral and litigation processes 
are just. Can we easily push all forms of adjudication into either a private, in-
expensive informal box called “arbitration” or a public, formal expensive box 
called “litigation”? As Thomas Main points out, it is extremely difficult to fig-
ure out what arbitration is, much less what it is good for.39 What if we decide 
that some hybrid processes are appropriate for certain kinds of disputes? And 
what if we call some of these hybrids either “arbitration” or “litigation”? Hiro 
Aragaki points out that the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration, which 
handles disputes between states, conducts a process called “arbitration” that is 
quite public and also court-like.40 Run out of the Peace Palace in The Hague, 
Netherlands, this entity was established in 1899 by treaty, to resolve various 
issues between states, and claims to have “developed into a modern, multi-
faceted arbitral institution perfectly situated to meet the evolving dispute reso-
lution needs of the international community.”41 
For me, the core and difficult enterprise is to find fair and just dispute reso-
lution processes for a broad array of contexts. What process is fair and just? I 
believe the answer will ultimately be that tried and true “it depends.” As I have 
written previously, we are trying to serve many private and also public interests 
as we set up our dispute resolution systems with respect to a broad array of 
domestic issues.42 A process that best serves private disputants’ interests in 
speed, efficiency, and (sometimes) privacy will not always best serve the inter-
est of the public in transparency, deterrence, and lawmaking.43 And a process 
                                                        
39  Thomas O. Main, Arbitration, What is it Good for?, 18 NEV. L.J. 457, 465 (2018) (assert-
ing that if arbitration is good for something, the something is circumstances in which parties 
have knowingly and voluntarily traded their right to go to court for an opportunity to resolve 
their dispute privately, through arbitration). 
40  Aragaki, supra note 26, at 546–48. 
41  Introduction to the PCA, PERMANENT CT. ARB., https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/ 
[https://perma.cc/MTM2-RMTH ] (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). 
42  See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a 
System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 296 (2003) [hereinafter Sternlight, ADR is Here] (urging 
that as societies choose and design the best dispute resolution systems for particular kinds of 
disputes, they should consider a broad range of individual and societal interests); Sternlight, 
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 36, at 1663 (discussing impacts of mandatory 
binding arbitration on individuals and on larger society, and concluding that public litigation 
is not necessarily the best means of resolving all disputes); Sternlight, Enforcing Employ-
ment Discrimination Laws, supra note 36, at 1487–88 (urging that both formal and informal, 
public and private systems of dispute resolution can serve important roles in resolving em-
ployment discrimination disputes); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Consistent with the Rule of Law?: Lessons from Abroad, 56 DE PAUL L. REV. 569, 573–76 
(2007) (urging that ADR can sometimes be supportive of justice in ways that publication 
litigation cannot). 
43  FED. R. CIV. P. 1 urges that the rules be “construed, administered, and employed . . . to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding,” but 
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that best serves the private or public interest in accuracy and fairness may not 
also serve interests in speedy low-cost resolution. In addition, we must remem-
ber the importance of protecting additional justice interests including procedur-
al justice and increasing societal harmony as well as reconciliation.44 Designing 
dispute resolution processes is difficult and requires the balancing of many fac-
tors, which sometimes are in tension if not direct conflict with one another. We 
also must wrestle with the question of when we should allow private disputants 
to pick the form of dispute resolution that best meets their needs, and when we 
should, instead, allow governments to make those choices, in order to protect 
the public interest.45 
In the end, I care far more about whether our various dispute resolution 
processes protect individual and societal interests in justice than I care about 
the naming of particular processes. For that reason, I am content to say “arbitra-
tion schmarbitration,” even as I share the concerns of Hensler, Khatam, and 
other authors in this symposium, who all seek to improve various forms of dis-
pute resolution. While I can certainly see that our very divergent uses of the 
term “arbitration” create substantial dangers of confusion, I am also doubtful 
that we can successfully police the labeling of dispute resolution processes 
throughout the world. In the mediation context, we have seen a tremendous 
amount of energy spent in articles, conferences, classrooms, and elsewhere, try-
ing to define true mediation,46 and yet I am dubious that this enterprise has ul-
timately improved our justice system. I also share the concern, expressed by 
commentators Aragaki, Garcia Sanchez, Noll, as well as many others in a va-
riety of contexts, that drawing a clear line between public and private is never 
easy, and quite possibly hopeless.47 In short, whether or not a domestic, interna-
                                                                                                                                 
does not focus on the fact that seeking speedy “justice” on the cheap may not always work 
out well. 
44  See Sternlight, ADR is Here, supra note 42, at 300 (discussing individual and societal in-
terests in justice). 
45  See, e.g., Sternlight, Enforcing Employment Discrimination Laws, supra note 36, at 1495 
(suggesting that “public agenc[ies] will be better situated than the individual disputants to 
decide whether or not a particular dispute has public as well as private implications,” and if 
so, how it ought to be resolved); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Any-
way?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 
2663, 2694–95 (1995) (urging that while it may be impossible to decide ex ante which dis-
putes should be assigned to which dispute resolution processes, clearly certain issues are so 
important that that they must be publicly decided). 
46  See, e.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 19, at 32; Moffitt, supra note 18, at 71–72; see also 
Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid 
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30–50 (2003) (developing a new way of analyzing vari-
ous styles of mediation); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strate-
gies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 23–24 (1996) 
(setting out the now famous/infamous distinction between “evaluative” and “facilitative” 
mediation). 
47  See Garcia Sanchez, supra note 16, at 507–08 (citing Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the 
Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1982)); see also 
Aragaki, supra note 26, at 563. 
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tional commercial or investor-state dispute resolution process is labeled “arbi-
tration,” I do believe we must try to ensure that these disparate processes all 
protect the justice interests of private persons and of the public at large.48 Hens-
ler and Khatam have done an exceptional job of setting out some important 
concerns along these lines and sparking a fascinating conversation regarding 
the proper realm of arbitration and litigation. I am grateful to both and to all the 
authors in this symposium issue for advancing our discussion of how various 
forms of dispute resolution can best serve justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
48  Moffitt, supra note 18, at 102. As Professor Moffitt expressed in the mediation context, I 
fear that focusing on definitions may hinder, rather than enhance, our efforts to ensure that 
dispute resolution processes provide justice. 
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